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ABSTRACT 
The view put forth in the present paper is that economic fluctuations emerge to change the 
political landscape. In this context it is hypothesized that state defaults are associated with 
autocratic polity changes. To support this view we use a dataset of all state defaults from 
1800 to 2004 and examine the empirical validity of the hypothesis that a state default leads to 
a decline in the level of democracy. Then we examine 3 case studies of state defaults that are 
consistent with our hypothesis: Spain in 1852, Greece in 1932 and Ecuador in 2000. The 
econometric results and the historical analysis of the three case studies are consistent with our 
main hypothesis.  
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1. Introduction 
 
A large literature (e.g. Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Bulow and Rogoff, 1989; Reinhart 
et al. 2003; Borensztein and Panizza, 2006) has identified the economic cost of sovereign 
default. Besides this identified cost, one can argue that state defaults have severe political 
repercussions. In this paper we argue that episodes of default are associated with transitions 
to more autocratic regimes.  
Our argument is based on econometric evidence from an unbalanced panel of 84 
countries from 1800 to 2004. As we argue the events that follow sovereign defaults lead to a 
decline in the level of democracy. Specifically we show that within the first 3 years from a 
default episode there is a statistically significant decline in the level of democracy. This effect 
exists even when we control for the economic environment, therefore we argue that it is the 
default per se that results in declines in democracy rather than the unfavorable economic 
environment. This main result is robust across specifications and it is a consistent in all time 
periods considered.  
To our knowledge the only other paper that examines the political implications of 
sovereign default is Borensztein and Panizza (2008). This paper though only examines the 
effect of state default on the survival of the government and finds evidence that defaults lead 
to changes in the incumbent government. However these changes can only be loosely 
interpreted as social cost: assuming that voters are not fully informed about the correct 
policy, if the policy of the incumbent government led to a default, the change in the 
governing party reflects updated information on behalf of the voters. But even if we assume 
that voters are fully informed a state default may reflect a change in economic environment 
which requires a change in policy generated by a new government. 
According to our argument a sovereign default has more severe implications for the 
political system.  A default is associated with increased political conflict within the country 
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and external political isolation. Both these effects are associated with a lower cost for a coup, 
as the cost of democracy for a rich elite increases and the probability of sanctions from other 
democracies decline (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). Then it may be easier for the elite to 
use repression, either to prevent the creation (if the regime is initially autocratic) or the 
consolidation of democracy (if the regime is already a democracy). 
To further support our thesis, after presenting our empirical results, we briefly discuss 
three historical cases which are in accordance to our story. These are the default cases of 
Spain in 1852, Greece in 1932 and Ecuador in 2000. Even though these cases occurred in 
different time periods and within very different institutional settings
1
 they give a clear way in 
which the political changes take place.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the following section we present our theoretical 
argument. In Section 3 we present the data for our statistical analysis. In Section 4 the results 
of the econometric model are presented. Section 5, then presents the three historical accounts 
that support the regularities identified in the empirical section. Finally Section 5 offers some 
concluding remarks.          
                                                 
1
 Greece in 1932 and for Ecuador in 2000 were democratic countries, whereas Spain in 1852 is classified as 
autocracy according to the Polity IV database.  
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2. Theoretical Motivation 
The economic effects of sovereign default have been widely examined in the 
empirical and theoretical literature (see Borensztein and Panizza, 2008 for a review of the 
main findings). What appears as a consensus from this literature is the fact even though 
defaults come as a consequence of bad economic situation and sudden stop of capital inflow, 
there are important costs from a state default that further hurt the economy. In most cases this 
cost is associated and is the outcome of the economic and political isolation that follows a 
default. For example, according to Rose (2005) foreign trade is seriously disrupted after a 
sovereign default episode. Furthermore, the economy loses access to credit in the financial 
markets (Tomz, 2007).  
Following Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), obstacles to trade and financial flows are 
expected to have adverse effects on the consolidation of democracy. Consider a country that 
has faced a sudden stop of capital flows and has defaulted in its external debt. Typically, this 
is a poor country, relatively abundant in labor. After the default the economy faces economic 
isolation, in terms of reduced foreign trade and no access to foreign credit. Standard trade 
theory then suggests that the returns to the relatively abundant factor, i.e. labor, fall whereas 
the return to the relative scarce factor, i.e. capital, increases. This in turns implies an increase 
in income inequality in the economy. In a democracy higher income inequality is associated 
with increased demands for redistributive policies. Therefore, democracy appears less 
appealing to the rich elite. As the rich elite has more to fear from democracy it is willing to 
use repression, either to keep the nature of an existing autocratic regime or to limit the power 
of the poor within a democracy. Thus it is the increase in political conflict that arises from the 
economic isolation of the country that creates the conditions for a decline in the level of 
democracy.  
 6 
Besides the above effects of economic isolation, according to Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006) political isolation may also explain why state defaults may result into lower 
democracy. As the literature has already shown a defaulting country faces political sanctions 
by its creditors (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989). As the country becomes politically isolated, the 
cost of a coup becomes lower, as there will be no additional political sanctions from other 
democratic nations. Then if coups are the outcome of a cost- benefit analysis on behalf of the 
elite, a reduction in the cost of the coup, even keeping its benefit constant, increases the 
probability that suck an event will occur. In this case political isolation is associated with 
higher probability of repression and restrictions in political and civil liberties. 
Additional arguments that support our main argument may be presented. For example, 
one can argue that sovereign defaults may lead to a de- legitimization of the political regime, 
which creates a political spiral which leads to a regime switch. This argument however 
suggests that regime switches may not always be towards more autocratic regimes. Instead 
defaults may be associated with democratic transitions as well.  Furthermore, one can claim 
that it is not the state default per se that leads to autocratic transitions but instead it is the bad 
economic environment within the country that favors these political changes. However to 
support such a claim one should find a negative association between bad economic 
conditions, i.e. the (current or past) growth rate of GDP Per capita , and the probability of an 
autocratic transition. If the effect of the bad economic environment is the only driving force, 
the inclusion of the economic variables in the estimated regression should either make the 
effect of default insignificant or at least reduce its magnitude/ significance. Therefore, in the 
empirical section we have to control of all the factors that influence democratic fragility in 
order to examine the empirical validity of the proposition that a state default is associated 
with a decline in the degree of democracy.  
 
 7 
3. Data 
The starting point of our analysis is the definition of a regime transition. For this 
purpose we use the Polity IV (2010) dataset, which provides the coding of the authority 
characteristics of states around the world and calculates various measures of how a country is 
governed from 1800 (or the year that the state gained its independence) onwards. The 
institutional features of a political regime are captured by the overall Polity Score which 
ranges on a scale from -10 to +10. A score equal to -10 (+10) indicates a strongly autocratic 
(democratic) state.
2
 Always according to Polity IV (2010) a regime transition is defined as a 
3- point change in the Polity Score variable, with this transition occurring (in the same 
general direction) within three years or less. Therefore, we construct the variable Autocratic 
Trans (Democratic Trans) to take the value of 1 when the Polity Score decreases (resp. 
increases) as indicated above.  
According to the hypotheses developed in the previous section, our empirical model 
seeks to explain the changes of the polity regime or within the regime rather than 
characterizing it. Thus for example a change of Polity Score from 10 to 7 would be coded in 
our dataset as an autocratic transition, however according to most coding that the literature 
uses the regime remains a democracy. We expect sovereign defaults to bring autocratic 
changes even within a regime rather than leading to an altogether switch to an autocratic 
polity. Therefore, in the empirical section we employ a dichotomous variable to mark 
changes in the regime rather than the level of Polity Score. Moreover we should note that 
according to our definition of the dependent variable, for a democratic transition to occur an 
autocratic one does not need to precede and vice versa. A transition to one polity may take 
                                                 
2
 According to Polity IV, a democratic polity has three essential characteristics: (i) fully competitive political 
participation, (ii) presence of institutionalized constraints on executive power and (iii) secured political liberties. 
In contrast, absence of these three characteristics typifies an autocratic country. 
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time to occur, whereas the transition to the other regime may occur within two or three years. 
The first transition is not coded as a transition, whereas the later is.  
To determine the date of a sovereign default we use the data of Standard & Poor’s as 
documented in Borensztein and Panizza (2008), where default episodes from 1824 to 2004 
are classified.
3
 We decided to include default episodes until 2004, in order to exclude yet 
unresolved cases of sovereign default, as well as exclude countries from our sample which 
have defaulted recently and political changes have not yet fully unraveled.    
Our main interest in the following section is to estimate the effect of a sovereign default 
on the probability of a regime transition. We follow the methodology of Frankel (2005) and 
Borensztein and Panizza (2008) and estimate the probability of democratic and autocratic 
transitions in “normal” times and after years of default episodes. According to this 
methodology then, the difference in probability of a regime transition is wholly attributed to 
the default. However, this is a rather extreme assumption: other forces besides a default may 
lead to a regime transition. For this reason and since the variable that we want to explain, i.e. 
regime transition, is dichotomous we also estimate a Fixed Effects (Conditional) Logit model 
with a number of additional explanatory variables. 
Severe economic downturns may have adverse effect on the survival of democratic 
institutions. Large deficits, and inability to service the outstanding debt which occurs before a 
default episode may be the driving force behind the autocratic transitions. As the literature on 
sovereign defaults shows (e.g. Calvo, 2003 Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011) a sovereign default is 
the outcome of a sudden stop in the inflow of capital. This sudden stop may be the outcome 
of a negative technology shock, negative fiscal conditions or debt overhang (Calvo, 2003). In 
                                                 
3
  As Borensztein amd Panizza (2008) show, there is variation on what different authors code as a default 
episode, due to differences in the methodology used to measure the length of default and on the definition of a 
default episode. Even though in the rest of the paper we use the Standard and poor’s data documented in 
Borensztein amd Panizza (2008) we also examine the robustness of our results when other definitions of default 
are employed, i.e. we use the default data from Beim and Calomiris (2000) and Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 
(2006) 
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any case all these shocks are correlated with a sharp decline in GDP. To disentangle these 
effects from the effect of sovereign default we introduce the variable Growth, which 
measures the growth rate of GDP per capita. We expect that an economic downturn will more 
likely result into tensions among political actors, which will be a destabilizing force for both 
an autocratic as well as for a democratic regime, and eventually will result into the demise of 
the regime. 
 Furthermore, following the large literature on the modernization hypothesis (Lipset, 
1959; Acemoglu et al., 2009; Csodás and Ludwig, 2011) we introduce the variable Log GDP 
per capita. According to this hypothesis, per capita income causes the creation and 
consolidation of democracy. Thus higher GDP per capita must be associated with lower 
probability of autocratic, and a higher probability of democratic transitions.
4
 
Besides economic variables additional explanatory variables are introduced. To account 
for various aspects of the regime we introduce the variables Durable and Polity Score (both 
taken from Polity IV, 2010), which measure the total number of years since the last polity 
transition and the nature of the political regime respectively. We expect a negative 
association between Durable and the probability of a regime (either democratic or autocratic) 
transition, as higher regime consolidation is expected to make a transition to another regime 
more difficult. With respect to the Polity Score we introduce it to capture the effect of regime 
characteristics on the probability of polity transitions without having some priors for its 
value. 
Armed conflicts and war may crucially affect the stability of the political regime. For 
this reason we include in our model the dummy variable War which takes the value of 1 
when the country experiences an internal or external war (data taken from the Correlates of 
                                                 
4
 The Growth and the GDP per capita variables are both taken from Bolt and Zanden (2013). As our sample 
goes back to the early 19
th
 century, data on other economic variables are not available. However as a robustness 
test we introduce additional variables which may account for the effect of negative economic conditions on the 
probability of an autocratic transition. Even though this reduces out sample  significantly it does not affect our 
main result (see Table 5). 
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War project, Ghosn et al., 2004).
5
 Finally to account for the prior history of the country we 
include as explanatory variables the number of previous polity transitions (variables Number 
of Autocratic Trans and Number of Democratic Trans) and defaults (Number of Defaults) 
respectively.
6
 
As there are a number of important country specific characteristics not included in the 
set of explanatory variables (i.e. geography, religious background, initial inequality, cultural 
characteristics) we estimate a Fixed Effects (Conditional) Logit model in order to account for 
country specific fixed effects. 
Our final dataset is restricted for a series a reasons. First as we want to include all 
institutional characteristics, geographical features or other country specific variables the 
proper specification is the Fixed Effects Logit model, which is a Conditional Logit model. 
The Conditional Logit uses only countries that exhibit changes in the dichotomous 
(dependent) variable. Therefore, all countries that do not experience an autocratic transition 
are automatically dropped from the sample. Moreover for most countries we have a 
incomplete time series for the GDP data for the years pre- 1916. Therefore our final dataset 
consists of 84 countries and 4538 observations. 
According to our dataset there are 154 default episodes. The country with the highest 
number of defaults is Uruguay (seven episodes), with Austria, Brazil, Peru and Turkey in the 
second place (six episodes). In our sample the country that has spend most years in default is 
Greece (with a total of 87 years  in default).  
Regarding the regime transitions most countries have only a few autocratic transitions 
with only 13 countries experiencing more than 4 autocratic transitions. The highest number of 
autocratic transitions in our sample are in Guatemala (seven) and in Turkey (eight). On the 
                                                 
5
 To be classified as a war, there should be at least 1000 battle related fatalities among all of the system 
members - states in interstate or two entities, government and/or non-government in intrastate wars-involved  in 
sustained combat (see Ghosn et al., 2004 for more details). 
6 The former variable also corrects for the violation of the independence assumption in cross sectional time 
series Logit regression (see Beck et al.,1998)  
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other hand, there are 32 countries with more than 4 democratic transitions in our dataset, with 
more democratic transitions in Chile (nine).    
 
 
4. Results 
Before estimating our main model, we follow Borensztein and Panizza (2008) and 
estimate the probability of a polity transition in “normal” times and then the probability of 
polity transition within 1, 2 and 3 years after a default.
7
 These results are presented in Table 
1. In the first column we estimate the probabilities for the whole period under consideration 
(i.e. from 1800 to 2004). In columns 2 and 3 we split the sample in two periods :1800- 1970 
and 1970- 2004. We split the sample in 1970 for several reasons. First of all, until the early 
1970s all defaults prior and shortly after the Second World War were settled and there were 
only few new default episodes (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). Furthermore, after that period 
the “Bank Advisory Committee”, also referred to as the “London Club” emerged as a 
coordinated negotiating procedure for the restructuring of commercial bank debt 
(Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2007). Finally, it is the year that splits our sample more or 
less equally.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
According to Table 1, over the 1800- 2004 period, in tranquil periods the probability of 
an autocratic transition is 3.13%. However within the first 2 years after a default this 
probability increases to 5.05%, with the difference between the two probabilities being 
statistically significant (p-values in the parenthesis). If we take a 3 year or an one year 
window there is still a significant difference in the probabilities, however somehow lower. 
                                                 
7
 This methodology is applied by Cooper (1971) and Frankel (2005) who estimate the political cost, i.e. changes 
in government after sharp currency devaluations.  
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Even though the above table is informative, it attributes the whole difference in the 
probability of regime transition on the default episode. As we have argued in the previous 
section this may not be a correct strategy. For this reason in Table we introduce a series of 
variables in a Logit model in order to account for all potential determinants of autocratic 
transitions. The results are presented in Table 2. Note that since the coefficients are odds 
ratios, a value of the coefficient below unity suggests a reduction in the probability that an 
autocratic transition will occur.
8
 
 [Insert Table 2 Here] 
According to column (1) having a default within the last 2 years results in a statistically 
significant positive effect on the probability of a transition to a more autocratic regime. This 
effect is also quantitatively significant: countries that experience a sovereign default have 
ceteris paribus 2.3 times higher risk of having an autocratic transition. This effect is 
marginally higher than the effect of a war, suggesting that at least as the survival of a 
democratic regime is concerned a war and a sovereign default may have the same adverse 
effects. Similar effects are estimated even when we allow for 3 years after the default for the 
transition to take place (column (2)) or one year (column (3)). 
With respect to the rest of the explanatory variables, they all turn out statistically 
significant (and correctly signed) with the exception of Growth. The negative effect of Log 
GDP per capita implies that an increase in the income of the economy results into lower 
probability of an autocratic transition. The same holds with the durability of the regime: long 
lasting democracies appear rather stable to regime changes. On the other hand, countries that 
experience more autocratic transitions in the past are more likely to experience a similar 
transition in the future. The odds ratio of Number of Defaults shows that countries that have 
                                                 
8
 And thus the associated t- statistic is negative. 
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experienced many defaults in the past are less likely to have a destabilizing effect on their 
political regime with a default in the present time.
9
 
The rest of the columns in Table 2 estimate the same model for 2 sub- samples, before 
and after 1970, following the rationale highlighted above. As the reader can easily verify 
qualitatively the results are the same. Moreover, there is an increase in the odds ratio of the 
default variable, which may be due to the fact that the full sample from 1800 to 2004 is 
highly heterogeneous with respect to time, with many events changing the underlying 
relationships. For this reason we explore this issue further in the robustness tests (Tables 4 
and 5).   
In table 3, we perform the same estimation, however this time the dependent variable is 
the variable Democratic Transitions. This variable is constructed using the same 
methodology as the variable Autocratic Transitions but it takes the value of 1 when the polity 
score increases by 3 points. Thus it measures whether there is a democratic change in the 
polity regime. In other words in Table 3 we examine whether defaults may have an opposite 
effect as well, i.e. lead to democratic changes in autocratic regimes. As the table shows this is 
not the case: in all cases the Default dummy turns out statistically insignificant, and the odds 
ratios are rather small (compared to the ones in Table 2).  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
In Tables 4 and 5, we examine the robustness of our results. First in Table 4 we estimate 
our main model with all polity transitions (i.e. both autocratic and democratic transitions) as 
dependent variable. We find a positive and statistically significant effect. According to the 
above two tables (Table 2 and 3) this result is mainly driven by the autocratic transitions. 
                                                 
9
 We have also examined whether the outcome of the war affects the probability of an autocratic transition. 
However our results showed that there is no difference in the associated probabilities for an autocratic transition 
when the war is lost or it is won by the respective country. These results are available from the authors. 
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However this column shows that the positive effect of defaults survives even if we pool 
together all regime transitions.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
In columns (2) and (3) we exclude from our sample the whole World War I, interwar 
and World War II period.
10
 We do this as this was a rather turbulent period, with many 
changes in all political regimes, the birth of new states and a general trend towards autocratic 
regimes. For this reason, we want to verify that our results are not driven by the events during 
that period. As column (2) and (3) indicate all our results remain robust even if we exclude 
this period. This is true both for our main variable of interest as well as the rest of the control 
variables.  
In order to ensure that out results are not driven by waves of democratization, in 
columns (4) and (5) we perform the same estimation this time we use three dummies which 
correspond to the years of the three waves of democratization.
11
 The results suggest that only 
the third wave of democratization is associated with reduced autocratic transitions, whereas 
the other two waves were associated with increased probability of democratic transitions. 
With respect to the rest of the results, there is no significant change in our main conclusions.  
The exact dating of sovereign default is not always straightforward. For this reason 
there are various sources that classify default episodes. To establish that our results are not 
driven by the particular choice of the Standard’s and Poor methodology (as documented in 
Borensztein and Panizza, 2008), we replicate our results by using the Beim and Calomiris 
(2000)- column (4)- as well as the Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2007)- column (5)- dataset 
on sovereign defaults.  As the reader can easily verify all our results remain qualitatively the 
same irrespective of the source used.   
                                                 
10
 I.e. we exclude from our sample the years 1910-1945. 
11
 The first wave from 1800 to 1922, the second wave from 1945 to 1962 and the third wave from 1974 
onwards. 
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Since we want to make sure that our result about autocratic transitions is driven by the 
default per se and not by the bad economic situation which precedes the episode of default in 
Table 5 we present a series of additional results. First in columns (1) and (4) we introduce in 
our main regression the average growth rate 2 years before the transition episode. If it is the 
economic cycle rather the default episode that leads to an autocratic transition, we expect that 
the average growth 2 years before the default to be significant and the default dummy to lose 
significance. As it is evident the effect of default remains qualitative the same with the 
baseline model both for the autocratic transitions as well as the democratic ones. With respect 
to the average lagged growth rate, in the case of autocratic transitions is insignificant (column 
1) but the democratic transitions it is negative and significant at the 5% level of significance. 
This implies that democratic transitions tend to occur in economic recessions which do not 
involve sovereign defaults. To further verify these results in columns (2) and (3) and (5) and 
(6) we introduce additional variables that account for the economic cycle. These variables are 
the unemployment rate (columns (2) and (5)) and the inflation rate and the change in the real 
effective exchange rate (columns (3) and (6)). All these variables are taken from World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators.
12
 These variables are available from 1970 onwards 
and with missing data for some countries and years thus their inclusion greatly reduces the 
original sample. However, the conclusions about our main variable of interest remain: the 
probability of an autocratic transition increases if there has been a default in the last two 
years. 
A final robustness test is presented in columns (6) and (7) of Table 5. As our theoretical 
proposition seems to apply to countries with an unconsolidated democracy, we want to make 
sure that our results remain if we exclude from the sample the countries that have more 
developed democratic institutions. For this reason, we exclude the countries that before the 
                                                 
12
 We have experimented with various specifications and combinations of the above variables. In all cases the 
results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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year of the transition had a polity score equal to 10 (column 6) and above 9 (column 7). Once 
again the results regarding our main variable of interest remain unchanged.  
 
5. Case Studies 
Even though case studies do not provide the robust statistical analysis of econometric 
models, they may shed more light to the issue of causality between the dependent and the 
explanatory variables. In this respect it is important to examine some cases where the course 
of events clearly supports the findings of the econometric model. These historical events may 
further support the empirical evidence presented so far, by establishing the underlying causal 
links and show that a true relationship between defaults and autocratic transition exist and 
that the results presented so far are not the outcome of statistical luck or outcome of omitted 
variable bias. 
The selection of the case studies is by no means random. We have tried to examine 
cases in very different time periods and different institutional settings, i.e. countries that were 
considered democratic and autocratic before the default. In this way we have tried to show 
the generality of the argument, both through time as well as cross country. The three cases 
considered are Spain in 1851- 52, Greece in 1932 and Ecuador in 2000. In Spain on 1850 the 
polity score was -2. After the default it declined to -5 in 1852 and to -6 in 1859. For Greece 
the decline was even more pronounced: the polity score was 10 in 1932, it fell to 8 in 1934 
and the next year eventually dropped to -8. Finally for Ecuador the index of democracy 
declined from 9 (in 1999) to 6 in 2000 where it remained until the end of our sample.  
 
5.1 Spain 1851-52 
After the 1808- 14 war of independence, Spain experiences a deep and long political 
crisis. This crisis, in tandem with an economic crisis eventually led to 8 default episodes 
 17 
during the 19
th
 century. Five of these episodes are classified as debt restructuring whereas the 
rest 3 cases were official debt defaults. 
One of the above mentioned episodes of default took place in 1851. The political 
instability after the first Carlist War (Guerra Carlista, 1833-1841) led to high budget deficits 
financed with short term loans (Comín,  2012). The debt restructuring in July of 1844, 
allowed the treasury to carry out the 1845 tax reform but the debt level did not become 
sustainable (Comín,  1998). This was intended to be corrected with a new debt restructuring 
which was implemented when Juan Bravo Murillo became President of the Council of 
Ministers of Spain (1851).  
The restructuring that took place acknowledged all existing debt and reduced it into 
two types of bonds: State and Treasury. Existing debt, with one or more capital discount, was 
converted into State Bonds whereas all floating and short term debt was converted into 
Treasury securities (Comín,  2012). Even though the results of the restructuring on the 
outstanding debt was only slight,
13
 foreign debt holders described Murillo’s restructuring as 
“disguised bankruptcy”, Spain was ranked as an insolvent country and the Paris stock 
exchange was closed to Spanish securities.  
As a second step to correct the debt problem caused by high deficits Murillo 
undertook a series of reforms in the tax collection which extended the reforms that begun in 
1845. In order to correct the inefficiency of administration he proposed a constitutional 
reform. Murillo was known for his despotic political views and his admiration for the French 
coup d’état of Napoleon III (Carr, 1982).  And these views were reflected in the proposed 
constitution which would turn the parliament (Cortes) into an advisory body chosen by 
25,000 electors with no control over the budget. Murillo was trying to draft an authoritarian 
constitution which could be applied rather than keeping a liberal one which in reality was 
                                                 
13
 The interest rate decreased only by 33% and the face value of the debt declined by only 2.2% (Comín,  2012).  
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turned into an instrument of the powerful (military) elite. And in this attempt Murillo had no 
support from the generals, the press or the parties, so Murillo was dropped by the court in 
December 1852. After two short lived governments, the Cortes turned to Conde de Sain Luis 
to become Prime Minister. In July 1854, the Army and the popular insurrection in Madrid 
ultimately toppled the government and ended the decade of Moderates in power (Payne, 
1967).   
The above case exemplifies our main argument: in an autocratic country, as was Spain 
in 1852, a state default and the associated attempt to correct its causes resulted in a popular 
discontent and political unrest. This unrest allowed the elite to increase repression. 
 
5.2 Greece 1932 
 Greece besides providing the first historically recorded case of state default
14
 as early 
as 377 BC, it is also the country that has spent almost half its time as sovereign nation in 
default.
15
 However it is one particular episode of default that is in complete accordance with 
our main argument.    
The political scene in Greece during the interwar period is characterized by major 
changes spurred mainly by the events following the 1929 crisis. During the 1920s the growth 
in the Greek economy is mainly driven by the devaluation policy of the national currency 
(drachma). This policy lasted up to 1927, when it came to a halt after a loan agreement with 
the League of Nations. In the following year (1928) drachma enters the Gold Standard and it 
is pegged with the British Pound.  
The Great Depression hits Greece as early as in 1930. The decline in migrant 
remittances, which is the major source of capital inflows for the Greek economy at that time, 
                                                 
14
 When the 13 city- states defaulted on their loans from the Temple of Apollo in Delos.   
15
 According to the data documented in the following section, Greece has been in default for almost 90 years 
since its independence in 1821.  
 19 
together with the decline in agricultural prices and world demand for agricultural products
16
, 
are the channel through which the global economic crisis is transmitted to Greece. At the 
same time there was a huge rise in external debt at the level of 150% of GDP.
17
  
Given these economic conditions and the fixed exchange rate regime imposed by the 
Gold Standard, Venizelos the liberal prime minister of Greece, has no option other than 
defaulting on the external debt. At the same time a series of unpopular economic policies in 
an effort to correct the situation, like drachmatization of all deposits in foreign currencies is 
undertaken by the government (Bank of Greece, 1978:96). The unpopularity of these 
measures lead to political unrest and a spiral where Venizelos eventually loses office in 1932. 
A referendum restores Monarchy in Greece in 1935. In 1936 King George II helped solidify 
the self- coup of Ioannis Metaxas rise. The nature of Metaxas’ regime was evident by its 
intentions to abandon the existing mercantile/ capitalist system and replace it with a 
corporatist economic one, with the ultimate objective of promoting the national self- interest, 
and use corporatism as a process for the repression and co-optation of the labour movement 
(Moutos and Pechlivanos, 2015). Metaxas did not disguise his admiration for Nazism/ 
Fascism, however according to Clogg (1987) his regime can be more correctly categorized as 
paternalistic- authoritarian.
18
  
It is clear from the above account that the highly popular Venizelos lost his political 
support due to the economic events following state default (Mazower, 2009: 369). However the 
political unrest that pursued obviously led to the delegitimatization of the democratic regime 
rather than a change in the party in power. The case of Greece shows another interesting 
                                                 
16
 The events eventually led to a surge in the unemployment rate and to huge political unrest. Government 
officials in an attempt to correct this proposed a series of populist policies with no economic justification. For 
example according to newspapers of the time it was proposed to ban the inflow of foreign dancers as a cure to 
the high unemployment rate or to withhold one cigarette per package in order to give it as a transfer in kind to 
the unemployed (Kairofullas, 1988).      
17
 At the same level as in the years preceding the previous Greek default (1879- 89) (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009). 
18
 The repressive nature of the regime was evident:  books were confiscated from bookstores and homes and 
were later on burned, press was censored by law, and communists were sent to exile (Clogg, 1992). 
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aspect: the regime change is not instant. Instead it is a timely process that begins after the 
default. In fact for Greece in 1935 there has been a rise in output. However the political spiral 
that begun with the state default could not be reversed. The loss of the legitimacy of the 
democratic regime was such that an autocratic regime was established and lasted only to be 
changed by the outbreak of World War II.     
 
5.3 Ecuador 2000 
During the 1970s, Ecuador experiences a period of rapid growth mainly due to the 
utilization of the main oil reserves of the country. Oil exports on the one hand increase per 
capita imports and investment. However, this came at the cost of higher income inequality. 
Regarding the politics in Ecuador it is interesting to note that from 1979 to 2000 there have 
been nine different Presidents with different political views and a frequent involvement of the 
army in politics. This political instability has its roots on the structure of the economy and 
mainly on the heavy dependence of Ecuador on its oil reserves.
19
  
In 1998 Jamil Mahuad became president of Ecuador. In that time he inherited an 
economy in sharp decline; falling oil prices, the decline in banana export revenues (the 
second most important exportable product of Ecuador), and the SE Asian financial crises led 
Ecuador in its worst economic crisis in a century.  Its GDP declined by 35%, the currency 
depreciated by almost 195% and the unemployment rate doubled to reach to 17% (Jacome, 
2004; Martinez, 2006).  
On September 30, 1999, under these economic conditions Ecuador defaulted on its 
Brady bond obligations. In order to ensure financing from abroad, president Mahuad at the 
same time announced an austerity package, froze the savings of the population during the 
banking crisis and proceeded with the adoption of US Dollar as the national currency. These 
                                                 
19
 The frequent changes in the political system has been attributed to the 1983 default, which was the outcome 
of the Dutch disease experienced by the Ecuadorian economy (for the Dutch disease and the Ecuadorian 
economy see Ismail, 2010).  
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measures generated fierce opposition to the government from the indigenous peasant 
population, which were already hit hard by the crisis. 
The ensuing popular uprising on January 21, 2000 was supported by the armed 
forces.
20
 Indian protestors marched on the National Congress, and the army which was 
supposed to guard the building stepped aside and allowed the opposition to overthrow the 
government and replace them with a People’s Parliament. Soon a group of junior officials 
joint the indigenous group and a governing junta was formed. The democratically elected 
president Jamil Mahuad was sent into exile (Zamosc, 2007).  
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
We have shown that episodes of sovereign default tend to have a close association with 
severe political changes. As the three case studies have shown and our econometric evidence 
verified, economic turmoil after a default episode together with the economic decline which 
eventually led to the default episode create important political dynamics. These dynamics 
appear to lead to suppression of political and civil liberties and to less liberal political 
regimes.    
From a policy perspective these results have important consequences. Even if the 
economic cost of default is low, the political cost from the society’s point of view is quite 
high. As long as lower political and civil liberties are associated with a decline in the welfare 
of the population, the welfare cost of a default may be very high and must be also included in 
the calculation of the cost of a sovereign default.   
                                                 
20
 President Mahuad lost the support of the army since the economic crisis had resulted in a 60% cut in the 
armed forces budget (Barracca, 2007). 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Autocratic Transitions 
Autocratic Transitions   All defaults   1824-1970 1970-2004 
Tranquil years   3.13%   3.30% 2.96% 
Within 2 years after Default   5.05%   6.38% 4.44% 
p-value   0.00   0.00 0.05 
            
Tranquil years   3.11%   3.24% 2.99% 
Within 3 years after Default   4.60%   6.47% 3.72% 
p-value   0.01   0.00 0.23 
            
Tranquil years   3.11%   3.31% 2.88% 
When in Default   3.63%   3.91% 3.48% 
p-value   0.24   0.29 0.27 
            
observations   4916   2346 2570 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full SampleFull SampleFull Sample1800-1970 1970-2004
Log GDP per capita (-1) 0.442** 0.445** 0.439** 0.086** 0.766   
(-2.289) (-2.264) (-2.303) (-2.354) (-0.327)   
Growth Rate 0.196 0.190 0.191 0.038*** 0.364   
(-1.195) (-1.219) (-1.226) (-2.764) (-0.499)   
Durability of Regime 0.931*** 0.931*** 0.931*** 0.725*** 0.994   
(-3.464) (-3.475) (-3.452) (-3.483) (-0.350)   
Democracy (-1) 1.092*** 1.093*** 1.091*** 1.180*** 1.154***
(4.567) (4.626) (4.574) (4.327) (3.498)   
War 2.111*** 2.099*** 2.093*** 1.041 4.941***
(2.667) (2.646) (2.632) (0.084) (3.279)   
Default within last 2 years 2.362*** 4.677*** 3.968***
(2.887) (3.482) (3.025)   
Number of Defaults 0.374*** 0.366*** 0.384*** 0.485 0.095***
(-3.540) (-3.639) (-3.497) (-1.437) (-3.530)   
number of autocratic 
transitions 2.089*** 2.091*** 2.081*** 5.028*** 7.077***
(3.714) (3.713) (3.703) (3.415) (4.908)   
Default within last 3 years 2.166***               
(3.101)               
Default in last year 2.775***               
(2.590)               
Log-Likelihood -520.605 -520.444 -521.094 -185.110 -210.692
obs 4538 4538 4538 2108 1555
wald 52.08 59.87 48.91 43.80 48.18
R2-p 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.34 0.19
Table 2: dep. Variable autocratic transitions 
coefficients in odds ratios;clustered t-statistics in the parenthesis; *,**,*** denote 
statistical signifficance at the 10%,5%,1% level respectively.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full SampleFull SampleFull Sample1800-1970 1970-2004
Log GDP per capita (-1) 0.410*** 0.409*** 0.408*** 0.069*** 0.201*  
(-3.329) (-3.308) (-3.332) (-3.579) (-1.752)   
Growth Rate 0.114** 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.401 0.026** 
(-2.553) (-2.577) (-2.580) (-0.722) (-2.237)   
Durability of Regime 0.953*** 0.953*** 0.953*** 0.961 0.941***
(-2.880) (-2.870) (-2.873) (-0.946) (-2.687)   
Democracy (-1) 0.897*** 0.897*** 0.896*** 0.924* 0.744***
(-4.057) (-4.070) (-4.068) (-1.885) (-6.084)   
War 0.957 0.955 0.955 1.320 1.037   
(-0.231) (-0.245) (-0.244) (0.823) (0.118)   
Default within last 2 years 1.232 0.490 1.708   
(0.686) (-0.889) (1.491)   
Number of Defaults 0.906 0.915 0.921 1.326 0.534***
(-0.574) (-0.505) (-0.497) (0.957) (-2.947)   
number of autocratic 
transitions 2.188*** 2.181*** 2.178*** 2.348** 6.795***
(4.775) (4.748) (4.771) (2.139) (7.231)   
Default within last 3 years 1.072               
(0.274)               
Default in last year 1.080               
(0.188)               
Log-Likelihood -778.879 -779.137 -779.161 -244.133 -408.668
obs 4973 4973 4973 1871 2383
wald 88.74 87.44 87.11 25.13 87.57
R2-p 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.24
Table 3: dep. variable democratic transitions 
coefficients in odds ratios;clustered t-statistics in the parenthesis; *,**,*** denote 
statistical signifficance at the 10%,5%,1% level respectively.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All polity 
transitions
Autocratic 
Transition
s,no 
interwar
Democratic 
Transitions,
no interwar
Waves of 
Democra
cy-
Autocratic 
Transition
s
Waves of 
Democracy-
Democratic 
Transitions
Defaults 
from Baim 
and 
Calomiris(19
92)
Defaults 
from 
Sturzenegg
er and 
Zettelmeyer 
(2007)
Log GDP per 
capita (-1) 0.682** 0.426* 0.321*** 0.622 0.707 0.190*** 0.428**
(-2.533) (-1.868) (-4.292) (-1.315) (-1.144) (-4.016) (-2.283)
Growth Rate 0.286* 0.625 0.092** 0.105* 0.210 0.154 0.131
(-1.715) (-0.306) (-2.368) (-1.653) (-1.623) (-1.516) (-1.566)
Durability of 
Regime 0.939*** 0.950*** 0.948*** 0.943*** 0.942*** 0.906*** 0.934***
(-4.107) (-2.777) (-3.086) (-2.770) (-3.459) (-3.122) (-3.324)
Democracy (-1) 0.992 1.102*** 0.883*** 1.120*** 0.871*** 1.118*** 1.097***
(-0.812) (4.253) (-3.762) (5.133) (-5.302) (5.038) (4.435)
War 1.344** 2.584*** 0.976 2.304*** 0.941 1.817* 2.027**
(1.972) (3.127) (-0.113) (3.001) (-0.303) (1.763) (2.414)
Default within 
last 2 years 1.454** 2.080** 1.389 2.938*** 1.167 2.205** 2.289**
(2.065) (2.004) (1.047) (3.526) (0.496) (2.231) (2.055)
Number of 
Defaults 0.943 0.342*** 0.899 0.427*** 1.020 0.458*** 0.340***
(-0.550) (-3.021) (-0.614) (-2.648) (0.114) (-3.016) (-3.783)
Number of 
Transitions 1.200***
(3.988)
Number of 
autocratic 
transitions 2.176*** 2.962*** 2.610*** 2.274***
(3.246) (4.494) (4.028) (3.776)
Number of 
Democratic 
transitions 2.343*** 2.244***
(4.576) (5.463)
1st Wave 1.120 14.469***
(0.128) (3.649)
2nd Wave 0.956 2.046**
(-0.155) (2.558)
3rd Wave 0.154*** 1.557
(-6.108) (1.362)
Log-Likelihood -1209.05 -433.923 -689.133 -499.964 -756.759 -399.123 -506.573
obs 5072 3368 4260 4538 4973 3566 4431
wald 91.16069 39.37591 113.0633 82.47813 92.71762 58.51286 47.79494
R2-p 0.074454 0.116065 0.1349986 0.16827 0.1466243 0.1807978 0.1399541
coefficients in odds ratios;clustered t-statistics in the parenthesis; *,**,*** denote statistical signifficance at 
the 10%,5%,1% level respectively.
Table 4: Robustness I
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Autocratic 
Transitions
Autocratic 
Transitions
Autocratic 
Transitions
Democratic 
Transitions
Democratic 
Transitions
Democratic 
Transitions
Autocratic 
transitions, 
polity<10
Autocratic 
transitions, 
polity<9
Log GDP per capita (-
1) 0.424** 0.133* 0.002** 0.453*** 0.085 0.001* 0.551* 0.619
(-2.205) (1.724) (-2.267) (-2.923) (-0.924) (-1.921) (-1.693) (-1.350)
Growth Rate 0.313 0.054 0.000 0.177** 0.014 0.810 0.331 0.382
(-0.775) (-1.011) (-1.621) (-1.984) (-1.309) (-0.035) (-0.790) (-0.676)
Average Growth 2 
years before 5.544 0.009**
(0.964) (-2.481)
Durability of Regime 0.935*** 0.872 1.201*** 0.953*** 0.918* 0.971 0.929*** 0.920***
(-3.362) (-1.482) (3.117) (-2.907) (-1.682) (-0.690) (-3.622) (-3.474)
Democracy (-1) 1.092*** 1.270** 1.561*** 0.893*** 0.413*** 0.570*** 1.100*** 1.101***
(4.432) (2.193) (4.029) (-4.223) (-3.430) (-4.142) (5.006) (5.171)
War 2.331*** 65.756*** 43.864* 0.941 0.639 0.176*** 2.110*** 1.981**
(2.904) (3.305) (1.798) (-0.325) (-0.852) (-3.804) (2.734) (2.571)
Default within last 2 
years 2.593*** 39.590*** 14.962*** 1.167 4.137* 1.099 2.525*** 2.337**
(2.823) (2.879) (3.514) (0.519) (1.933) (0.108) (3.061) (2.507)
Number of Defaults 0.344*** 0.002*** 0.011*** 0.826 0.090** 0.154*** 0.333*** 0.332***
(-3.538) (-3.665) (-4.681) (-1.112) (-2.413) (-2.941) (-3.830) (-3.733)
Number of autocratic 
transitions 2.233*** 26.926*** 154.475*** 2.137*** 2.042***
(3.698) (4.002) (2.872) (3.668) (3.616)
Unemployment 0.844 0.957
(-1.023) (-0.346)
Inflation 8.012 12.748
(0.929) (1.296)
Change in REER 1.000 1.000
(0.384) (0.657)
Number of 
Democratic 
transitions 2.257*** 66.331*** 46.274***
(4.937) (5.950) (5.927)
Log-Likelihood -486.757 -40.056 -25.589 -753.66 -96.141 -89.095 -506.991 -482.682
obs 4281 321 340 4798 684 644 4262 4163
wald 46.70 21.48 643.19 89.65 61.99 119.09 58.91 55.69
R2-p 0.14 0.43 0.54 0.13 0.48 0.42 0.14 0.14
coefficients in odds ratios;clustered t-statistics in the parenthesis; *,**,*** denote statistical signifficance at the 10%,5%,1% 
level respectively.
Table 5: Robustness II
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